The Illinois Appellate court, 2nd District affirmed the Illinois Worker’s Compensation Commission holding that the arbitrator erred in ordering the recall of his first decision and issuing a second decision. Therefore, the arbitrator’s second decision was null and void, and the first decision was the final decision of the Commission.
Smalley Steel Ring Co., v. (Diaz), Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 16 ILWCLB 232 (Ill.App.Ct., 2nd 2008).
In his first decision filed on April 7, 2005, the arbitrator found the claimant’s case compensable. On May 10, 2005, the employer filed an emergency motion to recall the arbitrator’s decision and reopen proofs. The employer alleged it discovered new evidence from a coworker regarding the claimant’s true identity and his prior injuries. The arbitrator granted the motion. On Nov. 15, 2005, the arbitrator issued a second decision finding the claimant acted fraudulently and lacked credibility. The arbitrator denied benefits. On appeal, the claimant argued that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to recall his first decision, reopen proofs, and reissue a decision. The Commission agreed, holding that the first decision issued by the arbitrator was the final decisions of the Commission, that the arbitrator erred in reopening proofs and issuing a second decision, and that the second decision issued was null and void. The Circuit Court confirmed the Commission’s decision. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the Commission properly found that the arbitrator did not have the statutory authority to recall his first decision, reopen proofs and issue a second decision.
Section 19(f), of the WCA is the only provision under which an arbitrator has jurisdiction to recall decisions. Pursuant to Section 19(f), the Commission may reopen or modify a final award for clerical errors or errors in computation. No such errors were present in this case. The court explained that no other provision of the WCA provided for the filing of the employer’s motion or the arbitrator’s actions in granting that motion, reopening proofs, and issuing a second decision. Therefore, the employer’s motion and the arbitrator’s second decision were nullities.
Also, the court explained that fraud is not a basis for extending the statutory authority of the arbitrator or the Commission. Sections 19(b) and 19(f) provide for the finality of the arbitrator’s and the Commission’s decision, respectively, when further review has not been sought by either party within a particular time frame. Each section also provides for conclusive decisions “in the absence of fraud.” In Michelson v. Industrial Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to find that the legislature intended the “in the absence of fraud” language to give the Commission the authority to set aside its orders on the ground of fraud.
As the arbitrator did not have statutory authority to act, he was without jurisdiction to recall his decision, reopen proofs and issue a second decision.
