Illinois plaintif can't overcom Section 5(a) barrer to negligence claim against employer
An employee's injuries sustained whe she was assaulted outside her employer-restaurant before the start of her shift, arose out of and in the course of her employent, where evidence indicates she is regularly subjected to the employer's poor lighting while walking from the parking lot to the restaurant. Therefore, the employee may not bring a common-law action against her employer.
Case name: Lawson v. Schmitt Boulder Hill Inc., 17 ILWCLB 233 (Ill.App.Ct., 2nd 2010)
Lawson, a restaurant employee, arrived at work just before 6:00 a.m. and before entering the restaurant she was robbed, abducted and assaulted. She filed a two-count complaint against her employer, a restaurant owner, and the franchisor, alleging that her injuries were proximately casued by the defendants' negligence. The employer moved to dismiss based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. The franchisor also moved to dismiss, arguing that it owed no duty to Lawson.
The trial court granted both motions. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of Lawson's claim against the employer but reversed the dismissal of the claim against the franchisor.
On appeal, Lawson argued the Section 5(a) of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act did not bar her from maintaining a civil action aganist her employer. This provision bars a common law action by an employee against an employer and his agents where the accidental injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Lawson's injuries occurred in the course of her employment because she was abducted in her employer's parking lot shortly before staring her shift. Accordingly, the dispositive question was whether Lawson's injuries arose out of her employment.
In Litchfield Healthcare Center v. Industrial Commission, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a claimant's injuries, sustained when she tripped on uneven sidewalk while walking from the parking lot to her employer's residential health care facility, arose out of her employment. The lot was used by employees and visitors. The Litchfield court explained that special hazards or risks encountered as a result of using a usual route to the employer's premises satisfy the "arising out of " requirement of the WCA.
In this case, Lawson alleged a lack of proper lighting in her employer's parking lot. This condition of the parking lot was much a special hazard as the uneven sidewalk in Litchfield, and therefore, the poor lighting became a hazard of Lawson's employment. As in Litchfield, it made no difference that customers of the restaurant might use the same parking lot and might face the same hazard. Lawson's employment exposed her to the hazard to a greater degree than the general public would be subjected. Because Lawson's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment, she could not bring a common-law action against her employer.
