Illinois plaintiff's filing of a claim under the Illinois Workers' Compensation doesn't bar negligence claim
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the Circuit Court's order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence suit. The plaintiff was not estopped from seeking civil damages because she received workers' compensation benefits.
Case name: Reed v. White d/b/a Harris Farms, 17 ILwCLB 232 (Ill. App. Ct., 5th 2010).
Reed was injured when her vehicle crashed into a tractor and farm implement being driven by her husband. The farm implement was so wide it extended over the centerline of the road. At the time of the accident, Reed was on her way to drop off tools at her husband's employer, a farm. Reed was also an employee at the farm but was not scheduled to work on the day of the accident. After the accident, the farm voluntarily paid temporary total disaility benefits and medical bills
Reed filed a two count complaint against her husband and his employer, alleging negligence and vicarious liability against the employer. Reed also filed an application for benefits under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the civil suit, contending that Reed was precluded from a civil recovery pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel and the exclusivity provision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court granted the motion. However, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case.
The benefits received by Reed in the form of the payment of medical bills and TTD benefits were voluntarily made by the employer. The mere acceptance of unsolicited benefits offered by an employer is insufficient to bar Reed's common-law claim. In this case, Reed filed her workers' compensation claim just before the stattue of limitations would have run. She was merely acting with caution and protecting her rights. Relying on its decision in Wren v. Reddick Community Fire Protection District, the court determined that the Reed's filing of the workers' compensation claim did not estop her from pursuing her negligence claim.
The court rejected the defendant's contention that Reed's receipt of benefits and her attendance at a medical exam prior to hip surgery distinguished the case from Wren and precluded her from pursuing a common law negligence claim. Except for an initial response to an investigator, Reed has consistently maintained that she was not working at the time of the accident that the employer-employee relationship did not exist. Her denials started long before obtaining legal counsel. Reed filed her civil suit in February 2005, yet the defendants chose to continue to treat this as a workers' compensation matter. None of the actions taken by Reed with regard to the workers' compensation benefits voluntarily offered by the employer barred her from pursuing a common-law negligence claim.
