Illinois mental health worker fials to prove work accident caused carpal tunnel syndrome
An Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission majority vacated the arbitrator's finding that the claimant's right carpal tunnel syndrome was causally related to a a work accident and, accordingly, vacated a permanency award of 7.5 percent loss of use of the right hand. The Commission also reduced the permanency award for the claimant's back injury from 6 percent to 4 percent loss of use of the person as a whole, and vacated the award of penatlies and attorney's fees.
Case name: King-Alexander v. WA Howe Development Center, 19 ILWCLB 146 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2011)
Summary: Alexander, a mental health technician, alleged injuries while restraining an agitated patient Sept. 28, 2008. The arbitrator awarded 6 percent loss of use of the person as a whole, 5 percent loss of use of the right arn, and 7.5 percent loss of use of the right hand. The arbitrator also awarded $2,439.16 in Section 19(k) penalties and $487.83 in Section 16 attorney's fees. However, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission modified the decision by finding that Alexander's right carpal tunnel syndrome was not causally related to the work accident, and vacating the arbitrator's permanency award of 7.5 percent loss of use of the right. The commission also modified the arbitrattor's permanency award for Alexander's back injury from 6% to 4% oss of use of the person as a whole. Lastly, the Commission vacates the award of Section 19(k) penalties and Section 16 attorney's fees.
In finding Alexander's right carpal tunnel condition causally related to the accident, the arbitrator relied upon a chain of events analysis over the causal connection opinion of the defendant's Section 12 examiner. The arbitrator found that the examiner did not review the medical records and that the defendant engaged in doctor shopping when it obtained the examiner's opinion one year after the accident. However, the Commission viewed the evidence differently and found that Alexander's right carpal tunnel syndrome was not causally related to the work accident. Signficantly, Alexander did not complain about her right hand until two months after the accident. Also, Alexander contended that her job was repetitive in nature, but she alleged that a specific event, not repetitive trauma, cased her conditions. In addition, she did not submit a medical opinion establishing a causal connection between her right carpal tunnel syndrome and the work accident. Furthermore, the defendant's examiner's report reflected that he did review the medical records in conjunction with his examination.
In contrast to the arbitrator's opinion, the Commission did not believe the defendant was engaging in doctor shopping when it retained the examiner. By statute, the defendant was entitled to a Section 12 examination. The examiner noted that carpal tunnel syndrome can be associated with diabetes. The Commission conclused that the bilateral nature of Alexander's carpal tunnel syndrome, along with her conceded diagnosis of diabetes, further supported the finding that her right carpal tunnel syndrome was not due to the work accident.
