Case name: Goolsbey v. Rockford Memorial Hosptial, 17 ILWCLB 224 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2009)

Goolsby, a hospital employee, testified that she was walking down a hallway shen she suddenly fell. Two visitors were walking in front of her at the time and came back to assist her. Goolsby testified that it felt like her foot caught on something. She does not know which foot got sutck. She testified that she was not rushing at the time of the incident, she did not know what caused her to fall, and she did not notice anything that would have caused her to fall.

A couple of weeks after the incident she went back to look at the area to determine what could have caused the incident. She testified that there appeared to be dimpling of the tile in the area where she fell and believed this could have caused her accident. The hallway was open to the general public. A nurse testifed that she came to assist Goolsby immediately after the fall and did not see any subtance on the floor or defect in the surface of the floor.

Case name: Owens v. United Parcel Services Inc., 17 IlWCLB 215 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2009).

Owens was hired as a driver's helper for the defendant for the holiday season from November 2006 through December 31, 2006. On Dec. 14, 2006, Owens was delivering a package for work when he slipped on a step and fell forward, hitting the inside of his right knee on a wooden deck. He was diagnosed with a right knee contusion and sprain and was prescribed medication and a knee brace. On April 10, 2007, Owens sprained his right ankle when he stepped off a sidewalk and into a grass covered hole. The arbitrator awarded benefits. Upon review, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission modified the arbitrator's decision to find that the April 2007 incident was a significant enough event to constitute an intervening accident that broke the causation chain between the Dec 14, 2006, work accident and Owens present condition of ill-being. In so finding, the Commission relied on the mechanism of the accidents, the doctors' foundational knowledge of the events and Wise's overall credibility. As such, the Commission reduced the benefit award.

Case name: Wise v. Maine Township HSD No. 207, 17 ILWCLB 220 (Ill.W.C.Comm. 2009).

Based on the testimony of a vocational rehabilitation consultant, the arbitrator found that Wise was not entitled to an award of permanent total disability under Section 8(f). The consultant found there was a stable labor market for Wise with potential earnings between $8 and $10 per hour. The arbitrator found that Wise was in good physical condition after the work inijury, was capable of performing medium-level work, and was no longer under medical care. The arbitrator also found that Wise did not conduct a diligent job search and that both vocational counselors identified an amount that Wise could earn after the injury.

Roby Ziegler, press secretary for the Illinois Attorney General's Office says that the only issue addressed in this case is whether past due child support could be deducted from a workers' compensation award or settlement. There are no other cases addressing this issue.

Under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, a debtor cannot place a lien against a settlment or award. Ziegler points out that in this situation , the word "lien" is too broad.

Frank Bartholomew fathered his son with Elizabeth Black. He subsequently signed a paternity agreement with Black.

The case was filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of John Bava, a Sears service tech. Bava was injured when he fell down a flight of stairs while at a customer's home. Bava's took leave according to Sears' rules and while he was still disabled by his injuries, attempte, on several occasions, to return to work. Sears would not accommodate his physical restrictions.

Instead, after Bava exhausted his leave time, Sears terminated him.

Case name: Illinois, Sate of Dept. of Healthcare and Family Services b. Bartholomew, 17 ILWCLB211 (Ill.App.Ct., 4th 2009).

Bartholomew received a workers' compensation settlement of $175,000. The trial courted ordered that the mother of Bartholomew's child recieve $20,473.51 from the settlement as current child support and that $9,216.77 be applied toward child support arrearages and interest due to the Illinois Department of Health and Family Services under an administrative support order

Bartholomew did not object othe use of his workers' compensation settlement to pay current child support. He argued, however, that workers' compensation benefits are exempt from judicial process for child support arrearages pursuant to WCA Section 21. Specifically, Bartholomew, contended that a request for payment of an arrearage pursuant to a child support lien for payment of a past due suuport obligation is a debt that is barred from collection from his compensation settlement. The Illinos Appellate Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court, reasoning that the court's order was proper based on the statutory exception to income exemptions for the collection of child support.

Section 15(d) of the Income withholding for Support Act specifically includes workers' compensation payments in the definition of income. The section also states that any other state or local law purporting to exempt statutorily defined income does not apply to proceedings involving the collection of child support. The court concluded that although Section 21 of the WCA exempts workers' compensation awards from liability for debts, Section 15(d) of the Withholding Act creates an exception to that exemption for the collection of child support, including arrearages.

Furthermore, the court explained that applyng Bartholomew's workers' compensation settlement funds to his past due child support also serves the intent of the WCA to surnish a measure of financial protection to the worker and his dependents for injuries received by him which arose out of and in the course of his employment. Sections 7 and 8 of the WCA recognize a workers' dependents are intended beneficiaries.

Case name: Carreno v. Cambridge Homes, 17ILWCLB 210 (Ill.W.C..Comm. 2009).

In a previous decision, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commisison awarded Carreno 165 weeks of temporary total disability, $113,780 in medical expenses, and permanent partial disability for 250 weeks at $186 per week. After appeals to the Circuit court, appellate court and Supreme Court, the employer issued 18 checks. Two checks were made payable to Carreno and his attorney, representing TTD, PPD and interest, and 16 checks were made payable to Carreno, his attorney and corresponding medical providers.

Case name: Ruberstell v. US Foodservice, 17ILWCLB 209 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2009)

The Illinois Workers' Comensation Commissioin remanded the case to the arbitrator to determine whehter payments of medical expenses by Ruberstell's group health carrier qualified as being made pursuant to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act Section 8(j). As the manifestation date of the injury was determined by the Illinois Workers' Compensation to be Jan.16, 1998, Ruberstell would have had to file his application by Jan. 16. 2001, unless he filed the claim within two years from the date of the last payment of compensation related to his injury.

Case name: Warner v. Kewanee Hospital, 17 ILWCLB 175 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2009).

Warner, a nurse at the defendant's hospital injured her back while helping to lift an unresponsive patient from a vehicle. She underwent a course of injections for discogenic pain. However, because she reported only minimal relief from the injections, her doctor recommended an artificial disk replacement, which if denied by insurance, could be substituted with a fusion. The arbitrator denied Warner's request for surgery. Based on Warner's lack of credibility, in addition to an opioid dependence, insignificant MRI findings, and lack of other objective findings to support her complaints, the arbitrator concluded that Warner was not a surgical candidate and denied any additional treatment. Upon review, the Illinois Workers' Compensation affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator.

Case name: Johnson v. Will County Sheriff, 17 ILWCLB 131 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2009).

Johnson, a deputy sheriff, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while on duty and responding to a dispatcher's call to assist another deputy, who had arrested an intoxicated driver. Before the accident, Johnson left his assigned patrol area, without permission to pick up his personal mail from a post office. Upon receiving the the dispatch call, he informed the other deputy that he would arrive in three to five minutes. However, Johnson was actually 10 to 15 minutes from the deputy's location. The accident occurred outside the county and prior to reentering his patrol area. While on duty, deputy sheriff's are prohibited from leaving their assigned patrol area without first securing permission from a supervisor. The arbitrator awarded benefits. However, the Illinois Workers' Commission reversed, reasoning that Johnson was engaged in a personal deviation at the time of the accident. Also, the accident arose out of Johnson's own misconduct. Therefore, Johnson failed to prove he sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Case name: Giunta v. Chicago, City of, 17 ILWCLB 140 (Ill.W.comm. 2009).

The arbitrator awarded Giunta permanent disabilty benefits under Section 8(e)12 for 10 percent loss of use of the right leg. On appeal, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission found that the arbitrator erred in denying Giunta's request for a continuance

Case name: Giunta v. Chicago, City of, 17 ILWCLB 140 (Ill.W.comm. 2009).

The arbitrator awarded Giunta permanent disabilty benefits under Section 8(e)12 for 10 percent loss of use of the right leg. On appeal, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission found that the arbitrator erred in denying Giunta's request for a continuance

Case name: Negrete v. National Railraod Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 16 ILWCLB 211 (7th Cir. 2008).

Negrete, a former track-repair worker for Amtrak claimed that a work related back injury left him permanently disabled and unable to work. The U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois dismissed his lawsuit against Amtrak on the grounds that he had "intentionally flouted discovery deadlines, hidden and tampered with evidence and lied in his deposition." The 7th Circuit found that dismissal of the suit was an appropriate sanction under the circusmtances. Negrete's misconduct, which the 7th Circuit described as "appalling" included withholding names of physicians who had treated him for his injury, tampering with medical evidence, grossly understating rental income he received, misrepresenting his physical abilities, and missing 21 discovery deadlines. In response to Negrete's allegation that he was uneducated the 7th Circuit stated, "It does not take a graduate degree to understand that it is unacceptable to hide evidence and lie in a deposition."

Case name: Vasquez v. Hospira Inc., 16 ILWCLB 210 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2008).

Vasquez died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employmnet. He had three children. All were at least 18 years of age at the time of his death. The arbitrator found that the decedent's widow failed to prove that the oldest child was enrolled as a full time student in an accredited educational institution at the time of his father's death. The arbitrator concluded that pursuant to Section 7(a) of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act., the decedent's widow was entitled to receive death benefits from July 2, 2004, through Sept. 5, 2004, the day before her remarriage, or a total of 9-3/7 weeks. Thereafter, as the decedent had no minor children nor any children under the age of 25 enrolled as a full time student at an accredited educational institution, she was entitled to receive a lump sum payment equal to two years of compensation benefits, or $52,404.56

Case name: Diaz v. Supreme Catering Co., 17 ILWCLB 118 (Ill.W.C.Comm.2009).

On May 16, 2005, Diaz was injured while driving a catering truck for the defendant. The defendant's business included leasing, supplying and maintaining catering trucks, as well as vending machine sales and service. More than 80 people drove catering trucks for the defendant, and the defendant employed three supervisors to oversee the drivers. The defendant contended that it was not liable for benefits because Diaz worked as an independent contractor, not an employee. Relying on case law and Diaz's credible testimony, a Commission majority held that an employment relationship existed between the parties and the defendant was liable for benefits. Although the defendant paid Diaz no wages, the Commission found this fact, alone, was insufficient to negate the impact of the significant control the defendant exercised over Diaz.